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The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: An 
Empirical Study Based on Listed Companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
By Hao Liu 
 
This paper studies the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. 
After the reform of the Chinese financial system, ownership structure has become an 
important factor related to corporate performance. The study uses panel data regression 
analysis method to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and 
performance. In particular, this research analyzes whether firm performance is positively 
correlated with the largest share stockholder and the largest ten shareholders. It also 
analyzes the effect of the legal person shares and the index Z on firm performance. This 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
As Berls and Means (1932) study the relationship between stock ownership concentration 
and firm performance, relationships between ownership structure and firm performance 
have become a popular academic study. Over the past three decades, relationships between 
ownership structure and corporate performance can be separated into three different 
categories. First of all, Jensen & Mechkling (1976), and Shleifer, & Vishny (1986) find that 
the concentrated ownership and firm value have a positive relationship. Secondly, Barhram 
(2008) provides evidence that high concentrated ownership has a negative effect on firm 
performance. Finally, Mork, Shlerifer and Vishny (1988) indicate that the relationship 
between stock ownership concentration and firm performance is nonlinear.  
 
Berl and Means (1932) define corporate governance as a reaction to the agency problems 
resulting from the separation of ownership and operation. Some studies show that because 
of the separation of ownership and operation, many issues have been exposed, such as 
stock market manipulation, tax evasion, false financial reporting and fraudulent dealing. 
Corporate governance is designed as an effective mechanism to reduce the issues caused 
by the separation of ownership and operation. Although corporate governance mechanisms 
alleviate agency problems, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanism could be 
different due to the different ownership structures. For example, shareholders with a low 
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percentage of shareholdings have little or no incentives to monitor company management. 
They are willing to take a free ride instead of exerting monitoring behavior. On the other 
hand, shareholders with a high percentage of shareholdings have more incentives to 
monitor management because their share incomes depend on firm performance. Hence, 
understanding of the ownership-performance relationship could improve the efficiency of 
corporate governance and increase firm values. 
 
1.2 Purpose of Study 
Establishing efficient corporate governance has a positive effect on the modern market 
economy and the healthy movement of the security market. Corporate governance is an 
indispensable ingredient for sustainable growth and development in any economy and 
financial markets. It is not only relative to an individual or a company, but also relative to 
the stability of the financial system, economic growth, and the allocation of global capital. 
It is essential to study corporate governance of listed companies to see how this affects firm 
performance. 
 
A-share companies of Shenzhen stock exchange in Guangdong province are used to 
investigate the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance. The ownership 
structure has two main dimensions: identity of owner and ownership concentration. The 
identity of Shares can be classified into four categories: the state shares, the legal person 
shares, the employee shares, and the tradable shares (Ping 2004). The ownership 
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concentration is defined as the percentage of shares held by shareholders. There are two 
regressive equations used to test the four different hypotheses in chapter 3. The expected 
outcome is to see if the hypotheses are consistent with theoretical analysis. 
 
1.3 Need for Study 
In China, shares are classified as state shares, legal person shares, employee shares and 
tradable shares. This study attempts to investigate the relationship between the legal person 
shares and firm performance. The state shares and the legal person shares are not tradable 
in either Shenzhen stock exchange or Shanghai stock exchange. The state shares are 
controlled by the central government and local governments. The legal person shares are 
owned by the domestic institutions. The employee shares are designed as an incentive for 
workers and managers of a company (Xu & Wang, 1999). 
 
The tradable shares can be classified into tradable A-shares, tradable B-shares and 
H-shares. The tradable A-shares are only traded by domestic investors and domestic 
financial institutions. They cannot be traded in any foreign stock markets. The tradable 
B-shares are offered to foreign investors and some domestic investors and institutions. 
Additionally, the H-shares are listed on HongKong stock exchange (Xu & Wang, 1999). 
 
1.4 Statement of Problem 
This paper is designed to examine four hypotheses. First, the legal person share is 
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positively related to corporate performance. Second, the fraction of shares owned by the 
largest shareholder is positively related to firm performance. Third, the fraction of shares 
owned by the top 10 shareholders is positively related to firm performance. Fourth, Index Z, 
which is referred as a fraction of the largest shareholdings and the second largest 
















Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
Empirical studies so far have presented various results related to the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate performance. Berl and Means (1932) introduced the 
implications of the separation of ownership and operation. They provided evidence about 
the impact of ownership structure on the efficiency of corporate governance. Later, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) studied the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. In 
conclusion, scholars have studied the effect of concentrated ownership on firm 
performance and the relationship between the identity of shareholders and firm 
performance. They find that that the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance could be positive, negative, or nonlinear. 
 
2.1 Positive effects of the concentration of ownership 
Jensen and Mechkling (1976) explore how the firm value and concentrated ownership has 
a positive correlation. In their agency theory, it shows the solution of eliminating the 
agency relationship is to reduce the agency cost between the stockholders and the 
managers. They argue that the shareholder can provide appropriate incentives for the 
manager in order to prohibit the aberrant activities of the manager. Giving a proportion of 
shares to managers can guarantee that managers will make certain decisions which would 




Shleifer and Vishny (1986) indicate that the greater percentage of ownership large 
shareholders have the more profits can gain. They think that when large shareholders own 
more shares, they are willing to monitor the operations of companies. Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang (1999) also find the concentrated ownership and firm value have a positive 
relationship.  
 
2.2 Negative effects of the concentration of ownership 
Although large shareholders have the power to limit the aberrant activities of the managers, 
some studies show that because of the concentration of ownership, the large shareholders 
seriously interfere with the management of a company. As a result, the motivation of 
managers is lower and finally the firm value will decrease. Bahram (2008) uses Tobin Q 
and ROE as dependent variables to examine 50 Iranian listed companies of Tehran stock 
exchange from the period of 2001-2003. The outcome of analysis shows that the dispersed 
ownership positively affects the corporate performance. 
 
2.3 A nonlinear relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance 
Mork, Shlerifer and Vishny (1988) use Tobin Q as a firm’s performance indicator to 
examine how the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance is 
nonlinear. The study indicates that when the board shareholdings is located at 0~5%, Tobin 
Q and board shareholdings have a positive relation; when the board shareholdings is 
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located at 5~25%, the Tobin Q and board shareholdings have a negative relation; when the 
board shareholdings is located at 25~100%, the board shareholding and the Tobin Q 
become positive again. 
 
A sample of 1173 firms for 1976 and 1093 firms for 1986 is used to investigate the relation 
between Tobin Q and ownership structure. The outcome implies that the Tobin Q and the 
structure of equity ownership are positively relative until insider ownership reaches 40% to 
50%. After insider ownership is beyond 40~50%, the Tobin Q and the structure of equity 
ownership is negative relation (Mork, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). 
 
Additionally, Short and Keasey (1999) provide evidence of a nonlinear relationship 
between manager shareholding and firm performance. Their study explores that as the 
percentage of manager shareholding is below 15.58% or above 41.84%, firm performance 
and manager shareholding have a positive relationship; as the percentage of manager 
shareholding is located at 15.8~41.84%, firm performance and manager shareholding have 
a negative relationship. 
 
Summary 
All theoretical and empirical studies do not have a consistent result for the relationship 
between corporate performance and concentrated ownership. The previous studies 
demonstrate that the concentration of ownership and corporate performance have a 
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positive, negative or nonlinear relationship. Different levels of ownership concentration 
have different impacts on firm performance. Generally, the stock ownership concentration 
can be divided into three categories such as high concentration, high decentralization and 
moderate concentration (Xiong 2008). 
 
The high concentration means that a majority of shares are held by one stockholder or 
several big stockholders. Other shareholders have a minority of shares. The absolute 
controlling shareholders have power to control the operation of a company, and to 
influence company policy and regulation. The high decentralization means that there are 
no big shareholders. The percentage of shareholdings of individual shareholder is small, 
and each shareholder has limited influences on corporate governance. Under this situation, 
the largest shareholder is not able to control over the company. A disadvantage of the 
dispersed ownership is that the efficiency of corporate management is low. Any important 
decisions are made by a meeting of shareholders, so the agency cost is increased. Moreover, 
moderate concentration is designed to balance the power of large shareholders. A 
disadvantage of moderate concentration is that the largest stockholder cannot control over 
a company and cannot make decisions based on his or her own profit maximization. (Xiong 
2008). 
 
In order to solve the problems of corporate governance, an ownership concentration which 
is formed by several large shareholders and some small shareholders is considered as a 
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moderate structure of ownership. The advantages of this ownership structure are clarified 
as follows. First of all, the large shareholders have power to control corporate management 
and are able to discover existing problems in a company. They have motive and ability to 
monitor and restrict the actives of the managers. Secondly, because large shareholders keep 
in balance mutually, the issues of insider control can be avoided. Finally, several large 
shareholders also can solve the issue of free ride of minority stockholders caused by the 


























Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
This paper focuses only on listed firms on Shenzhen stock exchange that issue only 
A-shares. Based on the previous literatures, when ownership concentrated ratio is high, big 
shareholders are benefits from the share income and private income. They are motive to 
monitor the activities of managers and collect company information. As a result, more 
revenue is generated by a company and big shareholders have more income. According to 
the previous studies, different level of ownership concentrations will have different 
impacts on firm performance. Berl & Means (1932) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
demonstrate the high concentrated ownership have positive impact on firm performance 
Therefore, the study is aimed to investigate the relationship between the ownership 
structure and corporate performance, as well as the relationship between legal shares and 
firm performance.  
 
3.1 Sample selection 
There are about 1397 listed companies trading their shares on Shenzhen stock exchange in 
year 2012. In order to keep data validation and pertinence, few steps have been taken as 
follow: (1) excluding the ST type companies because ST type companies’ business 
performance is bad or have been specially treated (Wang 2011). (2) Excluding companies 
that issue not only A-shares but also issue other types of shares such as B-shares. (3) 




Finally, there are 266 companies left for the study. The dataset used for this study is taken 
from Shenzhen stock exchange (www.szse.cn) and a Chinese web site called Hexun which 
provides financial reports and information of listed companies in China 
(www.Hexun.com). 
 
3.2 Variables description 
The variables used for the study are the dependent variables, independent variables and 
control variables. Most scholars use Tobin Q as the index of corporate performance. 
However, the state shares and the legal person shares are not tradable in China’s stock 
market. Moreover, most shares are not able to flow into secondary market. Thus, the 
efficiency of the stock market is low. Using Tobin Q as the index of corporate performance 
is no proper for the China security market (Xiong, 2008). 
 
The dependent variables, price to book ratio (P/B) and return on equity (ROE), are used as 
the index of a firm’s performance. The independent variables are the legal person shares 
(LS) and the ownership concentration ratio (CR). The ownership concentration is 
measured by the percentage of shares held by stockowners. The concentration ratio CR1 
and CR10 respectively represent two different percentages of shareholdings by the 
shareholders. In addition, the index Z is a concentration ratio between the largest 
shareholder and the second largest shareholder. When the index Z is large, it indicates that 
12 
 
the largest shareholder has more control power than the second largest shareholder. As the 
index Z gets larger, the board is dominated by the largest shareholder. The control variables 
are the natural logarithm of total assets (SZ), leverage (LEV). The calculations of each 
variable are shown in Table 1 in appendix A.  
 
3.3 Models  
In this paper, there are four hypothesizes that will be tested by two regressive functions.  
1) The legal person share ratio is positively related to corporate performance.  
The simulation model is  
ROE = α + 𝛽1LS + β2SZ + β3LEV + +𝜀   (3.1) 
 
Where 
ROE is the index of the performance of firms 
LS is the legal person share proportion 
SZ is the natural logarithm of total assets  
LEV is the leverage ratio (D/A) 
𝜀 is the error term 
 




3) The sum of percentage of shareholdings of the 10 largest shareholders is positively related 
to firm performance. 
4) The index Z is negatively relate to firm performance 
The simulation model is 
ROE = α + β1CR1(Z or CR10) + β2SZ + β3LEV + 𝜀   (3.2) 
 
Where 
ROE is the index of the performance of firms 
CR1 is the percentage of shareholdings of the largest shareholder 
CR10 is the sum of percentage of shareholdings of the largest 10 shareholders 
𝜀 is the error term  
SZ is the natural logarithm of total assets 









3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Variable descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2       Variables descriptive statistics, 2012 
Variable Maximum Minimum Mean Std. Deviation Observation 
LS (%) 0.79 0 0.03 0.11 266 
CR1 (%) 78.97 8.29 36.31 15.08 266 
CR10 (%) 90.02 16.75 61.87 14.77 266 
Z 241.81 1 9.53 20.69 266 
LEV 94.78 2.39 35.72 21.81 266 
SZ 25.4 19.08 21.52 1.14 266 
ROE 47.47 -35.78 6.99 7.73 266 
 All values calculated by the statistic software, Stata. 
 
For 2012, there are total 28 listed companies that have the legal person shares. The 
proportion of the companies that have the legal person shares is 10.52%. This indicates that 
the participation of the legal shares is low. The standard deviation of LS is very small, so 
the difference of having the legal shares between each company is small. 
 
Moreover, the mean value of the percentage of shareholdings of the largest shareholder is 
36.31. There are 21% companies whose the percentage of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder is larger than 50%. Also, the mean value of index Z is 9.53. The result shows 
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that the largest shareholder has a power to influence board decisions, since the ratio of 
shareholdings between largest shareholder and the second largest shareholder is large.   
 
The mean value of the sum of percentage of shareholdings of the largest ten shareholders is 
61.87%. It indicates that the top 10 shareholders have absolute control power over 
company. When a stock ownership concentration is high, there is an agency problem 
between the top 10 shareholders and the minority shareholders. As a result, controlling 
shareholders may against the interests of minority shareholders because large shareholders 
can easily control the decision based on their profit maximization. The mean value of LEV 











Chapter 4 Results and Analysis 
4.1 Pearson’s correlation coefficients between related variables. 
Table 3   The correlation coefficients of variables, 2012 
 
 5% significance level for displaying with a star. 
 
From Table 3, the upper numbers denote correlation coefficients of each variable. The 
numbers below each correlation coefficient are the significance value. The outcome of 
analysis shows there is not significant linear relationship between LS and ROE because 
0.0372 is smaller than 0.5454.  
 
However, CR1 and CR10 have significant positive correlations with ROE. The index Z 
also has significant positive correlations with ROE. There is not significant correlation 
between ROE and LEV. 
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4.2 Hypothesis one: The relationship between the legal shares and firm performance 
 
Figure 1 The regression result of LS and ROE 
 
 
The regression result shows that the legal shares have no impact on firm performance. The 
first hypothesis, the legal person shares ratio is positively related to corporate performance, 
is failed. According to the previous theoretical analysis, the owners of the legal person 
shares have incentives to participate corporate governance. Generally, the legal person 
shares have a positive relation with firm performance. However, the empirical analysis 
does not support this hypothesis. The possible reasons may be due to the average value of 
LS is low. There are only 28 observations having the legal person shares in a total of 266 
observations. These small observations cannot represent the fact that the relationship 






4.3 Hypothesis two: The percentage of shareholdings of the largest shareholder is 
positively related to firm performance. 
 
 Figure 2 The regression result of CR1 and ROE 
 
The figure 2 shows that the percentage of shareholdings of the largest shareholder is 
positively related to firm performance. The CR1 has a significant positive correlation with 
ROE. Based on the theoretical analysis, the largest shareholder is the major investor. The 
largest shareholder has power to control corporate management and discover existing 
problems in a company. The largest shareholder has motive and ability to monitor and 
restrict the aberrant actives of the managers. Since the firm performance directly affects the 
share income of the large shareholders, the large shareholders have also motive to enforce 
profit maximization. The result is consistent with the second hypothesis which the 






4.4 Hypothesis three: The sum of percentage of shareholdings of the 10 largest 
shareholders is positively related to firm performance. 
 
Figure 3 The regression result of CR10 and ROE 
 
From figure 3, the CR10 has a positive significant correlation with ROE. The regression 
result supports the hypothesis that the sum of percentage of shareholdings of the 10 largest 
shareholders is positively related to firm performance. In general, when the combined 
holding of largest 10 sharers is high, the advantages of this kind of ownership structure are 
clarified as follows. First of all, several large shareholders have positive effects on 
corporate management and corporate governance. In the internal governance, they are able 
to restrict private benefits and reduce information asymmetry (Najah, 2008). Secondly, 
because large shareholders keep in balance mutually, the issues of insider control can be 
avoided. Finally, several large shareholders also avoid the phenomenon of free ride of 





4.5 Hypothesis four: The index Z is negatively relate to firm performance 
 
Figure 4 The regression result of Index Z and ROE 
 
 
Form the figure 4, the index Z is not significant. The p value is larger than the significant 
level 5%. The hypothesis is failed. As argue previously, if the index Z is high, the 
difference of control power between the first and second largest shareholder is bigger. 
Therefore, the largest shareholder may manipulate board decisions in order to benefit his or 
her profit maximization. If the decisions are made by the largest shareholder without taking 
others’ suggestions, the possibility of making mistake is higher. Thus, the firm 









Chapter 5 Conclusion 
The relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance is various. 
Scholars so far do not have a consistent result for the relationship between corporate 
performance and ownership structure. Generally, previous studies conclude that the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance could be positive, 
negative, non-linear or even they do not have a relationship between each other. In this 
paper, the outcome of the analysis shows that the legal person shares has not effect on 
corporate performance; the percentage of shareholding of the largest shareholder is 
positively related to corporate performance; the sum of the percentage of shareholdings of 
the largest ten shareholders is also positively related to corporate performance; the 











Table 1  Calculations of each variable 
Variables Calculation 
ROE Net income / shareholder equity 
CR1 Shareholding of the largest shareholder / total shareholdings 
CR10 Sum of shareholdings of the largest 10 shareholders / total shareholdings 
LEV Total debts / total assets 
SZ The natural logarithm of total assets 
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